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ABSTRACT  
 
In this paper we construct a general theory of forward guidance in economic policy 
making, in order to provide a framework to explain the role and strategic advantages of 
including forward guidance as an explicit part of policy design. We do this by setting up a 
general policy problem in which forward guidance plays a role and then examine the 
consequences for performance when that guidance is withdrawn. Following results in 
Acocella et al (2013), who extend the theory of economic policy to a world with rational 
expectations, we show that forward guidance provides enhanced controllability and 
stabilizability – especially where such properties have not been available before. As a 
by-product we find that forward guidance severely limits the scope and incentives for 
time inconsistent behaviour in an economy whose policy goals are ultimately reachable. 
It can therefore add to the credibility of a set of policies. 
 
Classification JEL: E42, E58, E61, E63 
Keywords: Managing Expectations, Stabilizability, Dynamic Controllability, Time 
Consistency, Two point boundary solutions  
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 John Williams, President of the San Francisco Federal 
Reserve and member of the Fed’s Open Market Committee, has argued 
that forward guidance and large scale asset purchases (popularly known as 
Quantitative Easing) are now the leading and most important forms of 
unconventional monetary policy (Williams, 2011). Both techniques were 
used extensively to engineer a recovery from the Great Financial Crisis of 
2008-12.  
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But, whereas Quantitative Easing has been studied in some detail
1
 and is 
comparatively well understood in terms of how it is supposed to work, if not 
in terms of how large impact it has had in practice, forward guidance has 
been equally widely used but with little understanding of how and in what 
circumstances it can work successfully, what the drawbacks might be, and 
what the impact might be. In short, we lack a proper analysis of the strategic 
value of forward guidance as a tool of monetary policy – both in general and 
in difficult circumstances. 
The existing literature on forward guidance is, at this point, rather limited 
and restricted to a few specific problems or circumstances. A natural 
concern is whether forward guidance statements have had a perceptible 
impact on expectations in practice. Kool and Thornton (2012) argue that 
they have not, at least not in the context of monetary policy in four leading 
OECD economies; whereas Campbell et al (2012) argue that they did in the 
US over a longer sample period (1990-2011). However, Del Negro et al 
(2013) suggest that our standard models often overestimate the size of 
these impacts. Obviously the jury is still out on that question.  
Unsurprisingly, given recent history, much of the theoretical work has been 
done in the context of interest rates being stuck at their zero lower bound. 
Here, for example, Gavin et al (2013) find forward guidance announcements 
lower interest rates, prompting consumption and output to recover, if private 
sector expectations adjust – more so, the longer the horizon. However, in an 
important qualification, Levin et al (2010) warn that the stability of the 
economy may be at risk. They also find that, given moderate negative 
shocks, forward guidance can be used to stabilize the system, but 
conjecture that large negative shocks (such as will appear in a big 
recession) will overwhelm the forward guidance effects and leave us unable 
to stabilize the economy. But whether that is a result of large shocks, or of 
insufficiently responsive policies/forward guidance, is a moot point – this is a 
point we return to below and find that it to be the latter. These results in turn 
prompt another line of thought; that the effectiveness of forward guidance 
may depend on the form of guidance offered – specifically whether it is 
Delphic (the expectations offered are in terms of outcomes, such as would 
be the case when trying to escape a serious recession), or Odyssean (the 
expectations offered are in terms of a policy rule, or how the authorities will 
react to changes in certain conditions)
2
. This corresponds to unconditional 
(or unconditioned) vs. conditional forward guidance with an exit strategy, in 
the language of Acocella and Hughes Hallett (2014). 
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In trying to construct a theory of forward guidance, any formal analysis must 
fit first within the general theory of policy announcements (Hughes Hallett 
and others 2012a,b; Acocella et al 2014)
3
. Any such a theory needs an 
understanding of the strategic advantage offered by forward guidance, its 
role in the policy arsenal, its value in terms of overall economic 
performance, and whether the expectations generated would be sustained 
or dissipated by time inconsistent revisions. That is the subject of this paper. 
We proceed by examining the advantages of policy rules which contain 
forward guidance, and then explore what is lost if those guidance terms are 
withdrawn. 
 
2. ECONOMIC MODELS WITH FORWARD LOOKING EXPECTATIONS 
 
                    Without loss of generality, we can write the generic 
linear RE model in its reduced form for a single policy authority, as follows: 
 
1 1|t t t t t ty Ay Bu Cy v      for t = 1,…,T.    (1) 
where  1| 1 |t t t ty E y    denotes the mathematical expectation of 1ty   
conditional on t  (a common information set available to all agents at t) 
and  is a vector of m control variables in the hands of the policymakers. 
The matrices A, C and B are constant and of order S, S, and Sm, 
respectively, and have at least some elements which are nonzero. In this 
representation,  is a known initial condition, and 1|1Ty   is some known, 
assumed or expected terminal condition (most probably one that describes 
the economic system’s long run equilibrium state4); and both are part of 
each information set t. Note that the values of  are not part of t since 
they are determined by the policymakers.  
Finally tv  is a vector of exogenous shocks and other influences on  with 
a known mean but which comes from an unspecified probability distribution. 
Notice also that the policy authority may have only q ≤ S explicit targets, but 
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the m instruments are assumed to be linearly independent. Thus, 
and . 
This model can now be solved from the perspective of any particular period, 
say t = 1, by putting it into its final form conditional on the information set 
available in that period: 
1
1|1 1|1 1|1 0
|1 |1 |1 1|1
00 . 0 0 . . 0
: . . .. . 0 . . 0
: . . .0 . 0 . . . .
: . . 0. . . . . 0 .
0 . 0 0 . . 0 0T T T T
y u vI C B Ay
A I
C
y u v CyA I B


           
                    
             
          
          
                    
 
 
  
   
  
  
   
 
(2)     
Although equation (1) has been solved from the point of view of Ω1, it must 
be understood that it could have been derived for each Ωt, t = 1,...,T, in turn, 
where  |  j t t jy E y  if j t , but |   j t jy y  if j t ; and similarly for u and 
v.  
The equation to which (2) is the solution makes it clear that neither 
policymakers, nor the private sector are required to make expectation errors 
for the policies to work as planned. In fact, equation (5) below shows just 
the opposite in that those expectations are exactly consistent with what the 
private sector/policymakers expect the outcomes to be. It then only remains 
to determine if it is possible to shift expectations in such a way that the 
economy’s outcomes can reach certain specified target values at certain 
points of time. 
It is easy to show that this final form solution always exists since the inverse 
matrix in (2) is well defined provided the matrix product AC does not contain 
a unit root. To see this, define the Toeplitz matrix in (2) to be: 
          
0 . 0
. .
0 . 0
. . .
0 . 0
T
I C
A I
T
C
A I
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
.   (3) 
This matrix is of order ST. Using the partitioning by time, the determinant of 
TT  is given by: 
               11 1. ,0.....0 ,0.....0T n TT I C T A

 
      (4) 
  
However    11 2 2,0.....0 ',0.....0T T n TT T I C T A

  
    , and so on. 
Hence we can write: 
   11 1 1 2 3: : 0 ... 0i i n i i i nT T I C O T A T T T I CA

   
        for i = 
2,…,T. 
These equalities follow from the partitioning in 
1
i jT

  and repeated 
applications of the Woodbury formula for the inverse of a matrix sum; and 
the inequality from the absence of a unit root in AC. But .1 nIT   Hence 
the inverse always exists by induction, subject to the no unit root condition 
imposed on AC.  
 
 
3. CONTROLLABILITY 
 
                     Given that the inverse discussed above always exists, 
we can write the model in final form in the following way: 
 
1|1 1|1 1|111 1
|1 |1 |11
. . .
. . .. . .
. . .. . .
. . .. . .
. . .
T
T T TT TT
y u bR R
y u bR R
      
      
      
       
      
      
            
, or y Ru b     (5) 
where
1( ),TR T I B
      1 1 0 1|1( | ) : 0 0 :T Tb T E v A y C y      , and 
  denotes a Kronecker product. In this representation, each 
, |1 |1/t j t jR y u    is an Sm matrix of policy multipliers for t, j = 1,…,T. 
Notice that 0, jtR  even if t < j. Hence equation (5) implies that jtR ,  is a 
matrix of conventional policy multipliers between |1ty  and |1ju , with a delay of 
t–j between implementation and realization if t≥j. In other words, causality 
runs forwards. But if t< j, then 0, jtR  represents a matrix of anticipatory 
 8 
 
effects, on |1ty , of an announced or anticipated policy change |1ju  at some 
point in the future.
5
 
 
Multi-period static controllability 
Static controllability defines the set of conditions which must hold if an 
arbitrary set of target values can be achieved for the endogenous 
variables ty  in each period. Define those target values to be |1ty ; and y the 
corresponding stacked vector of those desired values across time periods.  
Static controllability, meaning the ability to reach desired values for the 
targets in each period, evidently requires the matrix R in (5) to possess an 
inverse:
6
 
1( )u R y b      (6) 
where y, u and b are all understood to be expectations conditioned on the 
current information set t , including the terminal condition, as specified in 
equation (5). Hence: 
THEOREM 1 (static controllability under REs). Under REs, static 
controllability by a single player, as in any conventional backwards looking 
model, requires as many independent policy instruments as there are target 
variables in each time period.  
PROOF:  
From (5), 
1
T TR T B
 where T TB I B  . Hence 
1 1 1 1( )T T T T TR T B B T
      
exists if and only if 
1 1
T TB I B
   exists, since we already know that 
1
TT always exists. But the coefficient matrix, B, can only possess an inverse 
if S = m and if it has full rank: i.e., has rows and columns that are linearly 
independent. But those are exactly the same conditions as would provide 
period-by-period static controllability in a backward looking dynamic model 
(C=0).■ 
Multi-period dynamic controllability 
A model is said to be dynamically controllable if a sequence of instrument 
values 1,..., tu u  can be found that will reach any arbitrary values, ty , for the 
target variables in period t (in expectation) given an arbitrary starting 
point .0y  In this case we are not concerned with the period-by-period 
controllability of the target variables between periods 1 and t - 1. Starting 
                                                 
5
 A conventional backwards looking model will have 
,t jR =0 for all t<j; and constant multipliers 
,t j t jR R   for t–j = 0,...,T–1 if the model at (2) is linear. Neither of these things is necessarily true 
in (5). 
6
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time.  
  
from period 1, dynamic controllability therefore requires a sequence of 
intended instrument values, 1|1 |1,....., Tu u , that guarantee |1ty is reached in 
period t=T. Given an initial state 0y  and terminal condition 1|1Ty  , this is 
possible only if the sequence of policy multipliers and anticipatory effects in 
the t-th row block of (5), [ Ttt RR ,1, ..... ], is of full rank. That is, if 
,1 ,r[ .... ]t t TR R S . 
THEOREM 2 (sufficient conditions for dynamic controllability with REs). The 
economy represented here by (1) is dynamically controllable over the sub-
interval (1, t), when T ≥S and when t<T, if ,1 ,r[ .... ] .t t SR R S
7
 
PROOF:  
/1 ,1 , |1( .... )t t t T ty R R u b   is reachable over (1, t), using a Moore-Penrose 
generalized left inverse in  ,1 , |1 |1...t t T t tu R R y b

    , if ,1 ,r[ .... ] .t t TR R S  
But if T ≥ S, then ,1 ,r[ ... ]t t TR R = ,1 ,r[ ... ]t t SR R S , which provides the result.■ 
Comment 1. It is important to see why time inconsistency will not appear 
here. Controllability at period t means that, barring unforeseen shocks, the 
policymaker will be able to reach his desired values for yt in expectation. 
Hence, yt|t= yt|1= ty  are fixed or at least known quantities. But y1|t = y1|1 is 
fixed by history; and u1|t=u1|1 likewise. It is then easy to see that, if nothing 
else changes, ut|t= ut|1. The policymaker is of course free to set ut|t≠ ut|1. But 
he would never do so because ty  is his first best value and is reachable 
given no information changes or unforeseen shocks. Policy makers have no 
incentive, still less a strategic interest, in choosing to make themselves 
worse off than they need to be. Hence, to assert time inconsistency is to 
claim that rational policymakers would choose to make themselves worse 
off: a contradiction. 
 
4. STABILIZABILITY UNDER RES  
 
The theoretical analysis 
                 We can apply the reasoning underlying Theorem 2 to 
show that any economy can be stabilized to an arbitrary degree under 
rational, forward looking expectations if it is also dynamically control-able in 
                                                 
7
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necessary condition may involve a smaller subset of Rtj having full rank depending on how many 
policy instruments are available. 
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the sense of Theorem 2. An arbitrary degree of stabilization means that 
policy rules can be found to make the economy follow an arbitrarily stable 
path, based on an arbitrary set of eigenvalues, such that it returns to the 
original path following a shock. Theorem 3 below gives the Rational 
Expectations analogue of the standard stabilizability theorem for backward 
looking, or physical systems.
8
 
 
THEOREM 3 (stabilizability and REs). For any economy represented by (1), 
with arbitrary coefficient matrices A, B and C, we can always find a series of 
dynamic but forward-looking policy rules, |1 1|1 |1
1
T
t tj j t
j
u K y k

  ,9 such that 
the controlled economy is stabilizable up to an arbitrary set of eigenvalues, 
if that economy is dynamically controllable as defined in Theorem 2. 
PROOF:  
Equation (1), with arbitrary coefficient matrices A, B and C, can be reduced 
to its final form (2). Substituting the policy rule |1 1|1 |1
1
T
t tj j t
j
u K y k

   for 
each t = 1,…,T shows that the controlled economy will behave as, similarly 
to (5): 
1|1 0 1|11,1 1,2 1,11 1
1|12,1
1,
|1 1|1 |1,1 , 1 ,1
. .. . .
. .. .. . .
. . .. . .. . .
. . .. .. . .
. .. . .
TT
T T
T T TT T T T TT TT
y y cK K KR R
yK
K
y y cK K KR R


       
       
       
        
       
       
       
        
  (7) 
where 
0|1 0y y  and 
1
|1 |1 |1t t T tc b T Bk
   (
|1tb  was defined in (5)). Rewriting (7) in 
obvious notation, we now have 
1t ty RKy c                                        (8) 
where ty  is the stacked vector on the left of (7).  
For an economy to be stabilizable at t, it must possess the property that it 
would return to the initially expected path, whatever the initial conditions and 
shocks experienced up to that point, given no further shocks or changes in 
expectations appear (Wonham, 1974). This property will exist if the iteration 
matrix, RK, has its roots inside the unit circle. But we can go further. Any 
particular |1ty  
will follow an arbitrarily stable path if we can pick tTt KK .....1  
to 
                                                 
8
 See Wonham (1974). 
9
 Note that this control rule, for use in period t<T, employs actions and anticipated actions up to the 
end of period T. 
  
generate an arbitrary set of eigenvalues for that matrix for each t. Suppose 
we want to choose iteration matrix 
1D Z Z   , where   is a diagonal 
matrix of the chosen eigenvalues, and Z is a matrix of the  corresponding 
eigenvectors. Then, as long as T>S and the matrix R has full rank ST (i.e., 
m≥S, so that static controllability applies), we can calculate the required K 
from
1 1K R Z Z   . But if m<S and dynamic controllability applies (as in 
the theorem), then we can use a generalized left-inverse 
instead:
1K R Z Z   , with  
1
R R R R
    as one obvious possibility. 
This generalized inverse always exists, given dynamic controllability, since 
R R  has full rank with r[R]= mT by Sylvester’s inequality. To see this, recall 
 1TR T I B
   where 1TT

 is a square STxST matrix of full rank and 
 I B  is a block diagonal matrix with rank mT. Hence, by Sylvester’s 
inequality, r[R]≥ ST+mT-ST = mT. But if m<S, then  r I B  cannot be 
greater than mT by definition. Hence r[R]=mT, which means that 
 
1
R R

 exists and this value of R  is always available. ■ 
Comment 2. Note that the policy rules described in Theorem 3 are both 
forward and backward looking in that they react to expected future 
developments, including to the effects of these rules applied in the future, 
and to feedback from past outcomes (past “failures”) – in exactly the same 
way as the private agents in the economy have been assumed to do. 
Comment 3. Thus we can infer that a RE model which is dynamically 
controllable at t = 1 in the sense of Theorem 2, is also stabilizable from t = 
1. Hence Theorem 3 generalizes on Wonham’s original theorem, where 
stabilizability can be achieved for the first time only in period S. Notice that it 
is not, in general, possible to dispense with the feed-forward part of the 
policy rule for the obvious reason that it has to control both the feed-forward 
and the feedback behavior of the private agents. However it would be 
possible to apply a block diagonalization to the matrix K in Theorem 3, and 
transform the policy instruments to match, in order to remove any 
dependence on expected future outcomes. Such a block diagonalization 
exists since R
+
D is square. But, such a transformation typically involves a 
Jordan canonical form whose off-diagonal elements will still cross time 
intervals. 
Comment 4. The key lesson therefore is that, in models with forward 
looking behavior, the closed loop (as opposed to feedback) characteristics 
of our policy rules are of special importance. Closed loop means reacting to 
changes in expectations of future events as they appear, in addition to past 
outcomes as they deviate from plan. In backwards looking models, future 
events are represented by future exogenous variables. In such models, 
 12 
 
future variables do not influence current behavior (although economic 
performance might improve if they did). As a result, the distinction between 
closed loop and feedback rules is traditionally ignored as being unimportant. 
But given forward looking markets where current behavior and outcomes 
depend directly on expectations of the future, and where expectations of the 
future depend on the current outcomes, the distinction can be large (see 
Hughes Hallett, Acocella and Di Bartolomeo, 2012a). 
 
5. AN ILLUSTRATION: STABILIZABILITY, WITH AND WITHOUT FORWARD LOOKING 
POLICIES. 
We now construct two simple examples of this stabilizability result to 
illustrate the importance of using forward looking policies and forward 
guidance given forward looking behavior by the private sector. The 
examples are constructed to explain a paper by Cochrane (2011) which 
claims that the Taylor rule in a New Keynesian model will produce results 
that are typically unstable. The claim is correct, but not for the reason 
Cochrane supposes. The correct reason is, no rational policymaker would 
ever attempt to use a backward looking policy rule to manage an economy 
with forward looking behavior or anticipations. Forward guidance is needed 
as well. 
For the purposes of illustration, consider a one equation RE model with 
dynamics: 
1 1
e
t t t t ty ay by cx                                                (9) 
Such a model can be derived from a conventional New Keynesian model of 
the type used by Mishkin (2002), say, to assess the effectiveness of Taylor 
rules for controlling inflation and the output gap. That is, we can start from: 
  1 11t t t t t t tE z f v                            (10)     
 1 1t t t t t t t tz E z i E f                      (11)       
where (10) is an aggregate supply equation with dynamics, πt is the rate of 
inflation, zt the output gap; ft is the stance of fiscal policy
10
, it the interest rate 
(monetary policy instrument), and vt and ηt are random shocks. Equation 
(11) is therefore a forward looking IS curve. Eliminating zt between (10) and 
(11) now yields: 
   1 1 11t t t t t t t tE i E                        (12)          
where  1t t t t t tE z f           represents a composite term of 
“shocks” exogenous to both monetary policy and the economy. This 
definition of εt involves a natural approximation in that 1t tE z  should, strictly 
                                                 
10
 Many New Keynesian models specify marginal costs, mct, as the push factor in inflation, in place 
of ft. In this case (12) would have have ft+mct in t in place of the (+)ft term.  This 
alternative specification would lead to a model of the identical form to that specified here. 
  
speaking, be an endogenous (rational) expectation of the output gap. So 
classifying it as part of the composite error term is to recognize the reality 
that the private sector either does not have full REs for the output gap; or 
cannot measure them properly; or that the private sector is no more able to 
separate cyclical from structural changes in the trend of output on time than 
the policymakers – the typical delay needed for the data to do so accurately 
being up to 4 years
11
. Agents therefore typically use a simple forecasting or 
extrapolation device for 1t tE z instead. Given that, we can now recast (12) 
as a particular case of (9) with a  ;  1b      ; and c   . In 
this specification, xt is the policy instrument (interest rate); and yt is the 
policy target (inflation). 
Stabilization in expectation, based on our notion of controllability, can now 
be investigated using Theorem 3. Consider now two different decision rules 
for managing (9):  
a) with no forward looking elements, 
      1 1 2t tx k y k  ;                                   and      (13)         
b) with an added forward looking element, 
 say.                          (14)          
We substitute (13) and (14) into (9) to see the behavior of the economy 
under control in each case: 
              ; and                             (15) 
                                (16) 
respectively, where . Renormalizing (15) and (16) on their 
lead terms, then taking expectations conditional on information available in 
period t, and dropping the superscript “e” for simplicity, leaves us with two 
alternative models to be stabilized: 
         1 1 1 *1 1 1t t t ty b y b a ck y b 
  
                           (17) 
                  
1 1 1 *
1 1 1t t t ty b cd y b cd a ck y b cd 
  
                (18) 
It is already obvious that (17) presents us with only one opportunity, via the 
choice of , to choose the coefficients and thus the roots of the economy 
under control. Yet there are two roots. In fact, it will not be possible to 
stabilize this economy with a simple feedback rule at all, unless b>1, let 
alone do so up to an arbitrary pair of eigenvalues.  
Equation (18), by contrast, gives us the opportunity to choose two 
coefficients, and hence both characteristic roots in the economy under 
control, given our freedom to choose both  and d. Hence, this system is 
stabilizable; and stabilizable up to an arbitrary set of eigenvalues.  
We can demonstrate these two claims as follows. The roots of equation (17) 
are: 
                                                 
11
 See Hughes Hallett, Kattai and Lewis (2012). 
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                
1
21
1,2 1
1
1 1 4
2
b b a ck                                                (19)  
We can therefore only choose to have real roots (by choosing k1>-
(1+4ab)/4ac, if b,c>0); or to have the product of the roots less than one (by 
setting k1<(b-a)/c in under the same conditions). But we cannot choose the 
size of the roots individually. In fact to minimize the larger of the two, the 
best we can do is set =- a/c. That will give us  11,2 0,b  ; which 
means that we can stabilize the system with a simple feedback rule only if 
the system is stable already – that is, if and only if b>1; otherwise never.  
Notice that stabilizability is, in this case, determined by the coefficients of 
the model – not by the policy rule. So Cochrane (2011) is right to say that a 
forward looking New Keynesian model may not be stabilized by a Taylor 
rule. But the correct inference is: a New Keynesian economy can be 
stabilized by a Taylor rule, but only when that model is already stable. So if 
instability follows, the fault lies not with the rule, but with the model. Taylor 
rules do not, in themselves, destabilize the economy. 
By contrast, if we use a forward looking rule like (14), the controlled 
economy will behave as in equation (18). The roots of this system are: 
                   (20)            
which can be set to be arbitrarily close to zero – for example, by selecting i) 
/d b c     where 1  ; and ii) =- a/c. This implies roots of 
   1 1 111,2 2 0,         for (20), both of which lie within the unit 
circle. Stability is therefore assured in all possible circumstances. Indeed 
these roots are arbitrarily small if   is made large enough. In this case, 
therefore, an arbitrary degree of stability can be conferred on any model, 
including those that are unstable to start with. Moreover, the stabilization is 
done by the policy rule, not by the model. The key difference is that, in this 
case, the forward looking component in the rule, d, supplies the roots of the 
stabilized economy. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper we have outlined a general theory of forward guidance in 
economic policymaking. We have used entirely conventional assumptions 
about the working of an economy under rational expectations, on the model 
used to represent it, and the way private sector expectations are formed and 
can be exploited by the policymaker. We have thus provided a framework to 
explain the role and strategic advantages of including forward guidance as 
an explicit policy tool, and to underline the adverse consequences for 
performance when that guidance is withdrawn. What this paper shows is 
that forward guidance is an essential component of any policy rule in an 
economy which is subject to forward looking anticipations of future behavior.  
  
i) Given the rank condition discussed in theorem 2, forward guidance is 
necessary to secure stabilizability and controllability (the ability to reach and 
stabilize around specified values for the target variables) – unless the 
economy is already stable, in which case forward guidance is only 
necessary for stabilizing around the specified target values.  
ii) Without forward guidance, which provides the private sector with 
information about the policymaker’s future intentions, the economy may not 
be stabilizable; and will not, in general, be controllable with respect to any 
given target values. 
iii) The stabilizability and controllability properties conferred by forward 
guidance take effect immediately, from period t=1, rather than after t periods 
delay as would be the case in an econ-omy without anticipations effects. 
Forward guidance therefore creates an acceleration of the required policy 
impacts. It offers the policymaker the opportunity to control the economy 
from any date, as the private sector anticipates his future behavior and 
knows that he can control the economy under the rank conditions assumed. 
iv) Time inconsistency is not a problem under forward guidance unless there 
are insufficient policy instruments and policymakers are impatient and have 
very short horizons. To be specific, there are no grounds to suppose that 
policymakers acting in their own interest will show time inconsistent 
behavior unless both m<S and S/m<t, where t is the date by which stability 
and/or the desired target values are to be attained. 
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